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Abstract— The paper presents a novel algorithm to enhance the 
operational planning flexibility of protective measures of 
electromagnetic transients in smart power systems. The 
algorithm considers a risk constrained approach to place surge 
arresters and to enhance the power supply security. It facilitates 
a reduction in the number of surge arresters required for 
electromagnetic transient protection without taking a risk of 
damage to important equipment. For validation purposes, the 
algorithm has been implemented on a software environment 
with the IEEE 14 bus test system. Studies suggest that the 
algorithm reduces the hidden risks of electromagnetic transient 
events in smart power systems and enhance the equipment 
availability. 
Index Terms--Electromagnetic transient events, overvoltage 
protection, risk, surge arrester, security of power supply 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Damage to equipment caused by lightning strikes and 
subsequent failure of power systems can be mitigated by 
installation of appropriate lightning protection schemes: most 
commonly lightning mast protection and overhead ground 
wire protection [1]. However, since lightning is unpredictable 
and has complex origins of behavior, current prevention 
schemes are susceptible to failure. The resultant 
electromagnetic transient overvoltage events occurring in a 
power system can have disastrous consequences, such as 
generation asynchronism, line overload and system collapse 
[2]. For this reason it is imperative that power systems are 
protected from physical lightning strikes and impacts during 
an event. Protective devices that are commonly utilized in 
modern power systems to mitigate electromagnetic transient 
effects are surge arresters [3]-[6].  
Traditionally, surge arrester selection criteria have dictated 
that placement should be as close as is practical to the critical  
and important equipment, with their size adapted to energy 
absorption and overvoltage withstand requirements [6]-[7]. 
The theoretical framework supporting this design argues that 
an appropriately sized arrester can provide protection of 
electrical equipment by means of the creation of a low 
impedance path to ground during a severe overvoltage event 
[3]-[6]. Although traditional practice is rational, it is not 
always economically viable or robust in maintaining security 
of supply [7]. For example, in power systems where specific 
components (such as large generators) are critical to the 
supply capabilities of a network, these selection criteria may 
not provide optimal protection of the system to ensure the 
quality of supply. There are limited research publications on 
alternative surge arrester selection methods, with the 
exception of those proposed in [8]. Reference [8] evaluates 
the risk of failure of a surge arrester on the basis of physical 
transmission line tower configuration and the arrester itself. 
This paper explores an alternative method to traditional 
surge arrester selection criteria for the purposes of protecting 
critical equipment in the context of operational planning in 
smart power systems. Electromagnetic transient analyses on 
power systems is needed assess potential ‘at risk’ components 
that are more susceptible to failure under transient conditions.  
These risk factors can be used to create guidelines to 
recommend best-practice of placement of surge arrester 
uncompromising the quality of supply. Current guidelines do 
not necessarily account for these ‘at risk’ locations, 
highlighting a limitation in knowledge on alternatives to 
current practice. The analysis of current practices in 
conjunction with electromagnetic transient studies make it 
possible to reinforce smart power systems so as to allow for 
more economical and robust surge arrester sizing and 
placement while constraining the risk and high economic 
costs. As the power systems are modernizing towards smart 
operation, such guidelines are needed in order to observe the 
full strength of smart grids. 
The proposed approach addresses the risk categorization of 
a smart power system and how risk-constrained network 
planning can allow for a placement of surge arresters to 
mitigate electromagnetic transient impacts and to improve 
availability of important and critical equipment by taking into 
account the merits of smart operation of a power system. 
II. THE APPROACH 
A. Lightning Modelling 
Results published by [9] determine that an average 
lightning stroke current is generally 31kA in magnitude with 
the last percentile values falling in the 100kA range. This 
distribution can be approximated by (1). [6] 
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where IS is the stroke current amplitude in kA. 
 Using (1), it can be demonstrated that there is a 22.4% 
probability of any lightning strike exceeding a 50kA 
magnitude event. For this reason a 50kA magnitude strike is 
used in electromagnetic transient simulations, as it falls in the 
upper region of the distribution curve given in (1). The 
selected lightning stroke magnitude can vary, however 
saturation effects would need to be considered for each surge 
arrester.  Reference [2] demonstrates that a lightning strike 
can be simulated by use of a bi-exponential function: 
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where I0 is the lightning stroke current amplitude; α, β are 
constants determined by the wave front and half-amplitude 
time. Using a standard waveform of a wave-front time of 
1.2µs and a half wave time of 50µs the constants α and β are 
set to 1.3×104 and 4.4×106 respectively. The implementation 
of the lightning current waveform generator can be realized 
as per Fig. 1: 
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Fig.1. A simulated lightning waveform model  
 
The utilization of the summation block in conjunction with 
the exponential blocks allows for the construction of the 
characteristic double exponential waveform of a lightning 
impulse. The multiplication block is used to convert the 
waveform from kilo Amps to Amps for accurate impulse 
simulation. The time related control logic involving the step 
function, the sample and hold block, and the summation 
block are used to designate at what time the lightning strike is 
to be applied to a power system. This is set to 2 seconds to 
allow for system disturbance to occur only during steady state 
operation as opposed to start-up conditions. The 
multiplication block is used to scale the exponential 
waveform to the desired lightning strike magnitude of 50kA. 
The dependent current source is used to propagate the 
lightning impulse waveform to the output for simulation. 
B. System Reinforcement 
The proposed approach considers the risks associated with 
smart power systems based on behaviours following 
electromagnetic transient events. These risks can be 
categorized based on  
• Probability of a lightning strike occurring on an overhead 
transmission conductor 
• Effect of removal of equipment or conductors on a 
system’s load supplying ability 
• Likelihood of failure of critical equipment (equipment 
that will cause system collapse following disconnection) 
after an electromagnetic transient event with no 
protective measures in place 
 
 Reference [10] highlights that an overhead conductor has a 
higher probability of being struck by lightning than that of a 
ground-lying component such as a network transformer or 
machine. Considering that preventative measures in the 
proposed approach are assumed to fail and geographical 
location is unknown, any branch in a power system in an 
overhead location is categorized as at high risk of strike, and 
any ground lying components are classed as at a low risk of 
strike. This ‘high’ and ‘low’ classification simplifies risk 
classification to a manageable level. 
The effect of removal of equipment or conductors on the 
ability of the system to supply the required load can be 
determined by the application of load flow algorithms [10]. 
Disconnection of equipment demonstrates the susceptibility 
of a system to collapse during severe component- failing fault 
conditions. In some cases, removal of specific equipment 
such as large generators can cause other generators to exceed 
generation capacity, ultimately causing detriment to the 
security of supply. Equation (3) can be used to estimate the 
level of load increase or reduction that is required before 
system machines can operate within capability: 
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where 
New
Load
S∆ is the percentage load increase/reduction 
required, 
Limiti
S
,
is the maximum generation possible for 
each machine in MW, 
old
Gen
S is the generation of all system 
machines under regular load conditions in MVA, 
old
Load
S  is 
the regular load of the system in MVA, 
old
Load
old
Gen
SS −  is the 
MVA line losses of the system under regular load conditions, 
α is a constant that scales the line losses according to the load 
change, N is the number of machines in the system capable of 
generation. Load increase or reduction can also be affected 
through reactive power demands however reactive power 
demand can be supplied locally. Therefore, it is assumed that 
reactive power fluctuations are negligible. For networks 
where reactive power is significant, unable to be supplied 
locally or machines responsible for reactive power generation 
are already near steady state operating limits, reactive power 
variations should be accounted for. 
The construction of a risk classification system 
highlighting events that are detrimental to security of supply 
is valuable in determining the electromagnetic transient 
effects on a system without surge protection.  The proposed 
approach uses three classifications: low, high and extreme 
risk. Low risk classification is attributed to an 
electromagnetic transient event unlikely to cause a system 
failure. High risk refers to electromagnetic transient effects 
causing non-critical machines (machines that do not cause 
system collapse following disconnection) to become unstable. 
Extreme risk refers to electromagnetic transient effects 
causing damages to critical machines which can also lead to a 
system collapse. 
The determination of these behaviours allows for the 
possibility of a risk assessment to be performed prior to 
proposals for system reinforcement. Fig. 2 outlines the steps 
of the proposed approach. Initially each branch in the 
transmission network is defined as overhead or ground-lying. 
This determines the high or low probability of lightning strike 
susceptibility. Following classification, each branch and bus 
location is categorized as an overhead conductor, network 
transformer or machine. It should be noted that a network 
transformer in this paper is identified as a transformer that is 
not directly connected to a generator in the network. Note that 
the loadability limits and surge effects on these transformers 
are excluded from the research due to their extra ability of 
thermal absorption compared to other equipment in a system. 
(Should the need arise, they could be incorporated in a 
particular system.) Next, the effect of bus removal is 
incorporated to categorize the supply capability of the system 
should component disconnection occur. For example, if the 
component disconnection causes system collapse then the 
corresponding bus is classed as having an extreme effect on 
security of power supply. In contrast if the component 
disconnection does not cause system collapse then the 
corresponding bus is classed as having a low effect on 
security of power supply. Critical machines are identified as 
equipment that are responsible for security of power supply 
and cause system collapse following disconnection. In 
contrast non-critical machines are those that supply the 
energy demand but do not compromise power supply security 
as a result of their unavailability.  
The lightning strike depicted in Fig. 1 is applied to a single 
phase line that connects a bus. Following the application of 
strikes, the behavior of the system is investigated. A strike at 
a line location that does not cause system equipment damage 
does not require a surge arrester. In contrast, if a strike does 
cause equipment damage then they are to be identified. 
Following from this, if a critical machine is destabilized and 
the line location where the lightning strike occurs is near the 
terminal bus of a critical machine then a surge arrester is 
required to be connected at this location. This bus is then 
added to the ‘critical zone’. Alternatively, if a critical 
machine is destabilized and the line where the lightning strike 
occurs is not connected to a terminal bus of a critical machine 
then this bus is added to the ‘critical zone’. In contrast, if a 
critical machine is not destabilized and the line where the 
lightning strike occurs is not the terminal line of a non-critical 
machine then a surge arrester is not required at the line 
connected bus. Alternatively, if a critical machine is not 
destabilized and the line location where the lightning strike 
occurs is near the terminal bus of a non-critical machine then 
the bus is added to the ‘non-critical machine zone’. 
Following the classification of each bus and the 
construction of the critical and non-critical machine zones the 
network reinforcement solution is identified. New buses are 
constructed centrally to the ‘critical zone’ buses and ‘non-
critical zone’ buses respectively. Each zone bus is connected 
to the corresponding central bus via new transmission lines. 
The algorithm terminates after each system bus is accounted 
for with surge arresters located at each of the newly 
constructed buses in the reinforced transmission network.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed risk-based surge arrester placement algorithm. 
III. CASE STUDY 
1) Network 
The case study is aimed at determining a risk constrained 
network reinforcement solution to allow for effective surge 
arrester placement. IEEE 14 bus test system was used for the 
case study. The system consists of 5 synchronous machines, 3 
of which are synchronous compensators with each equipped 
with IEEE type 1 excitation systems. There are a total of 11 
loads in the sum of 259MW and 73.5MVAr. [11]  
The RMS voltage chosen for buses 1-5 and 6-14 are 66kV 
and 11kV respectively with a 100MVA base. [12] 
In electromagnetic transient studies it is required that 
synchronous machines are modeled with exciters and 
governors [13]. Machine data is shown in the Appendix with 
synchronous machine parameters and exciter data taken from 
[14] and [15] respectively. Governor data is from the hydro 
governor turbine model given in PSCAD/EMTDC [16]. 
The approach proposed in Section II is applied by 
integrating one bus site at a time. For example bus 3 is 
selected and put through the algorithm until its classification 
is completed. Then bus 4 is selected and put through the same 
procedure until all buses have been accounted for. 
2) Electromagnetic Transient Response of the IEEE 14 
Bus System 
In order to determine areas of concern following an 
electromagnetic transient event that may cause system 
collapse, the following steps are required: 
• Apply the lightning impulse model shown in Fig.1 on a 
single phase line connects at each bus 
• Observe synchronous machine rotor angle results to 
determine if the equipment damage may occur. 
A sample result for a lightning strike occurring at a line 
location near bus 3 is given in Fig. 3. Delta G1 to Delta G5 
represents the rotor angles of machines 1 to 5 with the colours 
blue, purple, cyan, red and green representing machines 1 to 5 
respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Rotor angle response for a lightning strike occurring at a line 
connected at bus 3 
 
A summary of the results following a strike on a line 
connected to each bus is given in Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
MACHINES IN THE IEEE 14 BUS SYSTEM THAT BECOME UNSTABLE FOLLOWING 
AN ELECTROMAGNETIC TRANSIENT EVENT 
The line location, with respect to the 
bus, that experiences a lightning strike 
Machines that 
become Unstable 
1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
4 3, 4, 5 
5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
6 5 
7 None 
8 4 
9 None 
10 None 
11 None 
12 None 
13 None 
14 None 
 
 
3) Electromagnetic Transient Response of the IEEE 14 
Bus System with Surge Arrester Reinforcement scheme 
According to [6], the most ideal placement of an arrester is 
directly at the terminals of the equipment to be protected. It is 
assumed in this case that it is possible to place the arresters at 
the terminal bus of each synchronous machine in the test 
system. This results in 5 arresters being required according to 
modern practices. Arrester maximum continuous operating 
voltage is taken as 1.08pu with temporary overvoltage ratings 
as 1.25pu [17]. Application of the methodology proposed in 
Section II.B advanced the results shown in Table II. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
MACHINES IN THE IEEE 14 BUS SYSTEM THAT BECOME UNSTABLE FOLLOWING 
AN ELECTROMAGNETIC TRANSIENT EVENT WITH THE PROPOSED 
METHODOLOGY 
The line location, with 
respect to the bus, that 
experiences a lightning strike 
Machines that 
become Unstable 
1 None 
2 None 
3 3 
4 3 
5 None 
6 5 
7 4 
8 4, 5 
9 None 
10 None 
11 None 
12 None 
13 None 
14 None 
 
An extract of a result for a strike on a single phase line at 
bus 3 is given in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Arrester reinforced rotor angle response for a lightning strike at a line 
connected at bus 3  
 
4) Effect of Synchronous Machine Disconnection 
Having determined the electromagnetic transient response 
of the IEEE 14 bus system with and without surge arrester 
reinforcement, it is imperative to determine the capabilities of 
the system following the disconnection of a load bearing 
machine. This is done through the steps: 
1. Remove a machine from the system 
2. Run a Newton-Raphson load flow to determine if the 
system is capable of compensation to supply the load 
Using the above steps in conjunction with (3) the effect of 
machine disconnection can be determined. Given that 
Machine 1 and Machine 2 in the IEEE 14 bus system are the 
only sources of real power generation, only these machines 
are investigated for the effects of machine disconnection. 
Results are shown in Table III. 
 
TABLE III 
EFFECT OF SYNCHRONOUS MACHINE REMOVAL ON THE IEEE 14 BUS SYSTEM 
Machine 
Removed 
Variation level of loads (
New
Load
S∆  ) 
1 81% load decrease 
2 131% load increase 
 
From the observation of Table III it is apparent that 
Machine 1 (the largest machine responsible for real power 
generation) is critical to maintain the security of power 
supply, since the system load needs to be decreased by 81% 
for Machine 2 to be able to sustain supply. 
5) Risk Classification of the IEEE 14 Bus System 
Observation of Fig. 3 shows that buses 1, 2, 3 and 8 are the 
terminal buses of each synchronous machine. This implies 
that these buses are in close to ground locations hence are 
classed as at low risk of strike. Bus locations 4, 5, 7 and 9 are 
shown as terminal buses to network transformers. These 
network transformers are assumed to be close to ground [11] 
and are therefore classed as at low risk of strike. All 
remaining buses connecting branches are overhead lines 
hence are classed as at high risk of strike. 
Since observation of results from Section III.D indicates 
that Machine 1 is the only critical machine in the IEEE 14 
bus system, the terminal bus of Machine 1 (bus 1) is classed 
as an extreme risk component as its disconnection results in 
system collapse. All remaining bus and corresponding branch 
locations are shown not to cause system collapse hence are 
classed as low risk components. 
Observation of results in Table I demonstrate that strike on 
lines connected at bus locations 1, 2, 3 and 5 form the 
‘critical zone’ of the system causes a damage to Machine 1. 
This follows that bus locations 1, 2, 3 and 5 are classed as 
extreme risk components. A lightning strike near the lines 
connected at buses 4, 6 and 8 would cause one or more ‘non-
critical’ machines to be damaged. This results in the 
classification of these components as high risk. All remaining 
bus and branch locations caused negligible disturbance to 
system operation following an electromagnetic transient 
event hence are classed as low risk components. This is 
reflected in the risk diagram shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5.  Risk diagram for the IEEE 14 bus system 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The paper proposes a surge arrester placement algorithm 
based on risks associated with protecting critical and other 
equipment. The algorithm categorizes system components 
based on event probabilities and the effects on system 
integrity, offering reinforcement solutions that can potentially 
mitigate the risk of system failure. 
Results of the study argue that risk categorization is 
plausible for power systems based on probabilistic events. 
Risk-based placement of surge arresters is more efficient at 
maintaining system integrity without detriment to the security 
of energy supply, while protecting critical and other 
equipment. The approach enables a reduction in surge 
arresters, uncompromising the risk of equipment damage.  
The classification of equipment based on probability of 
events as well as the electromagnetic transient impacts can 
guide risk-based protocols for the placement of surge 
arresters and to avoid equipment damage. In that context, the 
proposed algorithm offers a considerable value for expansion 
planning and to enhance the security of energy supply in a 
smart power system.  
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